ABSTRACT The blooming of the Internet of Things (IoT) needs a communication infrastructure to allow connecting a wide range of devices. Visible light communication (VLC) provides an attractive solution for these IoT devices. However, the broadcast nature makes the VLC prone to be exposed in the reach of eavesdroppers, which undesirably impairs the IoT system security. The negative factors in practical use, such as light reflection, light intensity, channel correlation, and channel estimation error, remain less touched. In this paper, we propose the SecLight to support both the multiple-input single-output VLC (MISO-VLC) and the single-input single-output VLC (SISO-VLC) IoT devices. A random time reversal scheme is first proposed to automatically steer the SISO-VLC signal to the legitimate receivers by scrambling the eavesdropper's channel. Then, we mathematically analyze the impact of channel correlation and channel estimation error inherent in MISO-VLC system and propose an effective approach to alleviate the decreased secrecy capacity by introducing the Karhunen-LoEve transform and equivalent artificial noise. Through extensive evaluation, the proposed SecLight framework proves to be able to aggravate the bit error rate of eavesdroppers, even when a malicious interception is intended while holding the secrecy capacity above 3 bit/s/Hz. Overall, our results demonstrate that our framework SecLight is a promising solution for enhancing the security of the IoT devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) consists of a large number of physical objects that are unique, interconnected, and accessible to each other over the internet in smart cities [1] - [6] . The IoT is designed to transform any object in the real world into a computing device with communication, sensing and control functions [7] - [9] . However, when there are more and more IoT devices and applications, this can lead to an increase in the number of malicious attacks [10] - [16] .
Visible Light Communication (VLC) emerged as a viable way to enrich the spectrum bandwidth of wireless communications by using Light-Emitting Diodes (LEDs) as a light source to carry data. The widely-deployed indoor LED The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Zhenyu Zhou.
infrastructure diversifies the VLC applications, ranging from offices, conference rooms to airport lobbies. However, as in most wireless communication systems, information security remains as a widespread concern in VLC system since its broadcasting nature, especially in the public place where eavesdropping can be easily implemented [17] . There have been several works on the security issue of VLC system. A fuzzy timing mechanism was proposed to isolate the eavesdropper from legitimate users by introducing differentiated time delay between them [18] . A VLC connection was established based on barcode between smart-phones, in which the security was maintained via the steerable screen view angles and the changeable user locations [19] . A series of research efforts sought for the solutions to VLC security from the viewpoint of physical layer, including jamming [20] , artificial noise [21] and beamforming [22] . However, most of related works did not take into account the light reflection in indoor environment. It was proved that the data of the legitimate user can be intercepted using only a few of the reflected lights [23] . Particularly, in the Multiple Input Single Output VLC (MISO-VLC) system, the impact of channel correlation and channel estimation error on VLC security is not neglectable, but less investigated in related works. In fact, these inherent attributes of visible light channels undesirably undermine the secrecy capacity. Although Mostafa and Lampe [22] presented upper and lower bound on the secrecy capacity according to the constraint of peak light intensity, we still need to consider the constraint of average light intensity because it has an effect on the balance between illumination and data transmission, depending on user needs (e.g. dimming levels).
In this paper, we propose a new eavesdropping-resilient framework, SecLight, for the purpose of secure VLC system. To the best of our knowledge, SecLight is the first to address the impact of reflected light, channel correlation and channel estimation error on the VLC security under both average and peak light intensity constraints.
In our preliminary work [24] , we proposed a random time reversal scheme for both SISO-VLC and MISO-VLC systems, and only discussed the impact of channel correlation on the VLC security. Here, we significantly extend the work by: a) modeling and analyzing the impact of channel estimation error on the VLC security, b) analyzing and calculating the secrecy capacity under time-varying error and additive noise error, and c) re-thinking the equivalent artificial noise method to improve the system secrecy capacity with the considerations of both average and peak light intensity constraints.
Our contributions are summarized as follows: 1. A random time reversal scheme is proposed to secure the SISO-VLC and MISO-VLC systems by exploiting the nature of path redundancy and time diversity. This scheme can make the light signals steerable to the legitimate user while scrambling the signals received by eavesdropper. 2. The channel correlation in MISO-VLC system is mathematically analyzed regarding the security. We prove that the channel correlation makes a larger portion of legitimate user's data accessible to eavesdropper, leading to a decreased secrecy capacity. A KarhunenLoEve (K-L) transform is thus employed in the framework to alleviate the degradation in secrecy capacity. 3. The impact of channel estimation error on the VLC security is modeled within the circumstance of additive noise error and time-varying error. We prove that the impact of additive noise error is similar to that of Gaussian noise on the system secrecy capacity, and the time-varying error causes the secrecy capacity to decrease significantly. We re-design the wireless artificial noise method with both average and peak light intensity constraints to enhance the system secrecy capacity.
4.
The SecLight framework is evaluated through extensive experiments in terms of system secrecy capacity and eavesdropper's Bit Error Rate (BER). We demonstrate that the proposed time reversal scheme is effective in preventing the data of legitimate user from being intercepted by aggravating the eavesdropper's BER, even when the eavesdropper uses Constant Modulus Algorithm (CMA) [25] for interception. The K-L transform and equivalent artificial noise method perform better to reduce the impact of channel correlation and channel estimation error under both average and peak light intensity constraints. Finally, a secrecy capacity above 3 Bit/Sec/Hz is achieved. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we give the system model and roadmap. In Section III, we first describe general indoor VLC channel model and consider the SISO-VLC security model, and then propose a random time reversal scheme in SecLight. In Section IV, we model and analyze the impact of channel correlation on the system secrecy capacity by leaking factor and cope with such impact with K-L transform. In Section V, we consider the impact of the channel estimation error on the system secrecy capacity by analyzing both additive noise error and time-varying error. In Section VI, we evaluate SecLight via extensive simulations. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VIII. Figure 1 shows an indoor VLC scenario, where a LED lamp is fixed at the center of ceiling. The LED lamp, which consists of either multiple small LEDs or one large LED, is modulated by the electrical signal to transmit data. The light signal will be received and demodulated via a photodiode. Without of generality in security works, we refer to the transmitter as Alice, the legitimate receiver as Bob, and the eavesdropper as Eve, respectively. SecLight aims to prevent the transmission link between Alice and Bob from being intercepted by Eve even if Eve takes any proactive action for interception such as Constant Modulus Algorithm (CMA). Note that SecLight does not rely on upper layers' encryption, and it defends against eavesdroppers from the perspective of physical layer security. In addition, SecLight only considers SISO-VLC and MISO-VLC. For the MIMO-VLC system, its output is similar to the laser communication that requires each transmitter to be directional [26] . It has not been widely used in the actual indoor VLC scenario. Thus, the MIMO-VLC is not discussed in our paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ROADMAP

III. SISO SECURITY MODEL A. VLC CHANNEL MODEL
In the visible light communication system, the LED is used to send the required signal. The light signal is transmitted to receivers through the free space. The basic channel model can be expressed as:
where y(t) is the received signal, s(t) is the transmitted signal, h(t) is the impulse response function, n(t) is a zeromean, additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) term, and ⊗ is convolution. S is the amplitude of s(t), which needs to meet non-negative and peak light intensity constraints [27] :
where A is the maximum peak light intensity of the LED. In addition, the average light intensity should be a constant number due to the requirement of illumination. Namely, S also needs to meet the following constraint:
where f S (s) is the probability density function of S, and P is the rated light intensity of the LED. Note that, it is different with wireless channels where the cost is defined as the transmitted energy that depends on the squared amplitude of the signal.
In our system, we consider light's both direct and reflected paths. The impulse response function h(t) is expressed as:
where r represents the total number of paths. r = 1 is the direct path, and others are the reflected paths. In order to facilitate the interpretation of our work, we assume a total of four reflection paths, which corresponds four vertical walls of one room. The top and bottom wall surfaces are not considered because the light intensity is too small and the receiver's FoV is narrow. Furthermore, the light intensity from a reflection point is very weak so that we consider it has one reflection path from an entire wall surface [28] . a r represents the path of amplitude gain, τ r represents delay of each path, S i represents transmitter's position, and R j represents receiver's position. h(t) is usually written for vector mode:
where H dc and H ref are the direct channel gain and the reflect channel gain, respectively. When a LED works in Lambertian emission pattern, we can formulate the direct channel gain as [29] :
where φ is the angle of irradiance, ψ is the angle of incidence (measured from the axis normal to the receiver surface), m is Lambertian index, A is the receiver photodiode's collection area, and D d is the line of sight distance between S i (LED) and R i (PD). T s (ψ) is the gain of the optical filter, and ψ c is each receiver's Filed-of-View (FOV). g(ψ) is an optical concentrator gain, when 0
. n is the refractive index of the optical concentrator.
On the other hand, the channel gain of reflecting paths is represented as:
where ζ l is reflection point, N is the number of differential points in reflecting plane, and κ is the reflectivity. We consider the reflection occurs once on each reflecting path. Because the reflected signal is very slight, we assume that the contribution of a reflecting plane to the intensity of received signal is the same as that of a reflecting path.
B. SISO SYSTEM MODEL
According to the system model in Fig. 1 , we can express the signal received by Bob and Eve in the SISO-VLC system, respectively, as follows:
The existence of multi-path has brought interference to the receiver. However, it also makes an opportunity to enhance the system security by using time reversal, which can employ time diversity and path redundancy to augment the system adaptivity [30] . The transmitted signal is preprocessed with time reversal by exploiting the properties of superposition and reciprocity, such that the legitimate users can exactly recover the signal which is unable to be deciphered by eavesdropper. VOLUME 7, 2019 By bringing time reversal into VLC system, Equations (8a) and (8b) are transformed as follows:
where
The time reversal technique is mainly used in the Ultra Wide Band (UWB) system that transmits a set of short pulse signals. The channel impulse response function can be equivalent to δ(t) with a m amplitude and τ n delay. Here, it is similar to VLC's signals (transmitting non-negative pulse signals). The VLC's channel impulse response function under Lambertian emission pattern (Equation (6) can be equivalent to δ(t) with a m amplitude and τ n delay).
We define the VLC equivalent impulse response function R b (t) in the following. The formulation of security transmission is as follows:
Equation (10) is Bob's equivalent impulse response function. g(t) is the side-lobes waveform, which accumulates all cross-correlation functions from different paths. In the case of multi-path, g(t) trends to zero after incoherent superposition offset, thus it can be ignored. Therefore, we can simplify the equivalent impulse response function (10) into (11) , where five paths are assumed and the signal's amplitude is amplified 5 * a 2 m by R b (t) when t = 0. For Eve, due to the different delay between h e (t) paths and h b (t) paths, which means that h e (t) ⊗ h b (−t) is the superposition of various uncorrelated paths, the received signal y e (t) will be too weak to recover. In this case, Bob is the only user that can recover the signal successfully. Owing to the time reversal technique, the received signal become stronger at the legitimate user's end than the eavesdropper's end. Therefore, the received signal is submerged in the noise even if there are multiple eavesdroppers or the eavesdropper of multiple photo-detectors. The time reversal has the same security effect on both cases.
Meantime, the signal strength received from Eve is very low so that the BER of Eve degrades significantly.
So far, the above method has a certain encryption effect for the eavesdropper who does not take any action. For example, Eve is another legitimate user in the same office. However, if Eve is an active eavesdropper, he will be able to apply blind estimation algorithm (for example CMA) for deciphering [31] , due to the channel shows a regular change when the total volume of data increases. (We assume that the channel remains stationary during the two successive stages of channel estimation and data transmission). Thus, we need more complicated encryption.
In fact, the goal of physical layer security is to detect and prevent an intrusion. Previous work makes the eavesdropper's channel produce dramatic changes so that the eavesdropper is unable to track normal changes of the channel and then make blind estimation algorithm become invalid [32] . In order to be able to produce the dramatic change channel, we introduce random choice, which uses multi-path redundancy to improve the security performance of the system [33] . Note that, our method takes advantage of VLC reflected channels, which is not considered in previous work.
We add the random choice on Equations (9a) and (9b), as expressed by:
where w random <> h b (t) is path's random choice, it should ensure that one channel is selected at least. In this way, every frame data will choose different paths. The randomized path makes the channel state information (CSI) produce the dramatic changes, so that CMA fails.
IV. MISO SECURITY MODEL A. CHANNEL CORRELATION MODEL
The above situation only considers SISO situation, MISO situation is also common in real life, such as sitting room, classroom, meeting, etc. Therefore, we also apply the proposed SISO-VLC framework for MISO-VLC case. However, when there are multi-LEDs, channel correlation will greatly increase [34] . It's caused by IM/DD characteristics, which means that both the LED's frequency and phase are ignored during the signal transmission so that the channel correlation appears. In the VLC, previous work ignores the effect of channel correlation on the security. We define the leaking factor ε to discuss it.
First, we define the half-Kronecker channel model for the correlation model [35] :h
where h b and h e are channel gains in independent Gaussian condition, which means that no correlation is in the channel. R T is the correlation matrix. We think Bob and Eve have the same transmitter correlation from Alice due to LED lamp's fixed position. Meanwhile, because receivers' correlation is always in spurts with Bob's and Eve's position change. When Bob's position is very close to Eve's position, the channel correlation exists. Otherwise, There is no channel correlation between Bob and Eve. In addition, we assume that the receiver has only one photo-detector so that the inherent channel correlation does not exist. Therefore, we ignore the correlation effect of receiving terminal.
In Equations (13a) and (13b), R T is described as follows:
In the Equation (14), ρ ij is described as follows:
where ρ ij is the correlation between the ith LED and the jth LED. k = 1 represents Bob, k = 2 represents Eve. h 1i and h 2i denote separately the channel function between ith LED with Bob and Eve, i.e., the ρ ij value is related with channels that LEDs arrive at Bob and Eve, respectively. The angle betweenh b andh e is defined as α:
In order to analyze the impact of channel correlation to the secrecy capacity, leaking factor is defined as follows:
Since channel parameters are independent random variables, we use the average value of leaking factor to assess the impact of correlation on security. Expectations for Equation (17), we obtain E(ε) theoretical expression about ρ:
where tr() is the trace of matrix. When ρ increases, tr(R 2 T ) is increasing, and then Eε will increase. The increase of expectations illustrates that the angle between Bob channel and Eve channel will be small, which means that two channels are more and more similar. Therefore, Bob's information leaked to Eve increases, i.e., Eve can get more mutual information from Alice and Bob.
According to the work from Csiszar and Korner [36] , the increase of channel correlation will make secrecy capacity decrease. For BER, Kyritsi and Papanicolaou [37] already demonstrated that BER remains low in the condition of strong correlation, because time reversal exploits the properties of superposition and reciprocity. Thus, the correlation almost doesn't have the impact on Bob's BER.
B. APPLYING KARHUNEN-LoEve TRANSFORM
The Karhunen-LoEve (K-L) transform is based on the statistical properties, which is mainly used in the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) in signal processing and face recognition in image processing [38] . Its covariance matrix are zero, except for the diagonal elements. This matrix can cope with correlation between the data. We propose to apply K-L transform on channel correlation in SecLight as follows:
1. Compute a process of covariance forh b , and obtain covariance matrix R b ; 2. Implement Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) for R b , and obtain U ; 3. Obtain final channelh b_t = (U · U T ·h T b ) T . By utilizing above method, the system secrecy capacity will increase, as shown in the Section VI. We do not consider average and peak light intensity constraints for the channel correlation. The correlation between impulse response channels is not related to light intensity constraints. The correlation describes the degree of similarity between two channels.
V. THE SECURITY MODEL UNDER CHANNEL ESTIMATION ERROR A. RE-ESTABLISH CHANNEL MODEL
Under SISO-VLC and MISO-VLC models, the transmitter Alice estimates the channel by pulse sequences from the receiver Bob in cycle. However, the channel estimation error, which may be caused by additive noise error and time-varying error, is not considered. In this section, we will investigate the impact of channel estimation error on the VLC security model. In order to simplify the complexity of solving the generalized Rayleigh entropy, we assume the time-varying error is a constant within two successive stages of channel estimation and data transmission.
For Bob, he sends every pulse sequence to Alice at intervals. Therefore, we assume that there only exists the additive noise error in the channel. The channel between Alice and Bob can be modeled as follows: (19) where H AB is the actual channel, e AB is the additive noise error and it is subject to the independent zero-mean complex Gaussian distribution,Ĥ AB is the ideal channel and K is the K th time period. For Eve, he is the eavesdropper. He cannot transmit pulse sequences to Alice, and the channel between Alice and Eve will change over time. Therefore, we consider that the channel has both additive noise error and time-varying error. They can be described by the equation as follows:
where e AE is the additive noise error subject to the independent zero-mean complex Gaussian distribution, β ∈ [0, 1] is the time-varying channel factor. η is the error term introduced by the Kth and (K − 1)th channel and it is subject to the VOLUME 7, 2019 independent complex Gaussian distribution with zero-mean and variance σ 2 η . By Bayesian approaches we can know that [39] , the dis-
, which is still the complex Gaussian distribution:
where ϕ = β · σ 2 AE /(σ 2 AE + σ 2 η ), δ is subject to the complex Gaussian distribution with zero-mean and variance
). The time reversal ofĤ AB is as follows: 
where W rand is the vector form of w random , and S meets average and peak light intensity constraints by (2) and (3), respectively.
B. THE ANALYSIS OF BER AND SECRECY CAPACITY
BER. When there exist some errors in the channel, our time reversal technique has a certain performance of antiinterference. For the additive noise error, it is equivalent to Gaussian noise so that BER will be not affected. This is because the time reversal can transmit information under strong Gaussian noise environment. For the time-varying error, we consider that the time-varying channel factor is a constant in one cycle. The time-varying error only changes the amplitude of channel function, i.e., the time-varying error only changes the detection method of receiving rather than BER. Thus, the channel estimation error will not affect the time reversal method, and BER does not change. Secrecy capacity. Next, we analyze the impact of channel estimation error on the system secrecy capacity. In the Equation (22), we find that, both additive noise error and time-varying error clearly cause the change of channel state. We analyze further this impact by re-design beam-forming and artificial noise methods [39] , [40] , which are used to secure the wireless communication by physical layer characteristics. Our channel estimation error shows most of similarities with the artificial noise. For example, if we can make the space of additive noise error and time-varying error is orthogonal with the channel between Alice and Bob, additive noise error and time-varying error will not affect the system secrecy capacity. Meanwhile, it will increase intentional interference for Eve [41] . In order to better introduce methods mentioned above, we make following changes:
W rand ·Ĝ AB = w s means that we make the time-varying error represent the weighting coefficient of transmitted signal . W rand ·e AB ·S = −w z ·z means that the additive noise error becomes the equivalent artificial noise. Then, we can transform the problem of how to get the system secrecy capacity by optimizing W rand into how to optimize artificial noise and beam-forming weight for getting the system secrecy capacity.
Then, we obtain new equations as follows:
where equivalent transmitted signal power is tr(Q s ) ≤ P s , the equivalent artificial noise power is tr(Q z ) ≤ P z . Q s = E{w s ss H w H s } and Q z = E{w z zz H w H z } are power covariance matrixes of transmitted signal and equivalent artificial noise, respectively. tr() is the trace matrix. n 1 and n 2 are complex Gaussian noise with zero-mean and variance σ 2 1 and σ 2 2 , respectively.
The total power of equivalent transmitted signal and equivalent artificial noise meets the constraint: P s + P z ≤ P. P is the rated light intensity of the LED. Our equivalent artificial noise method is equivalent to divide P into P s and P z . P z is used to eliminate the impact of channel estimate error, which is similar to wireless artificial noise method. However, when the rated light intensity of LED is divided into P s and P z , the illumination and human eyes' perception may be affected. We need to take measures to improve it, which is detailed in following subsections.
Here, our goal is to optimize w s and w z above so as to maximize the system secrecy capacity:
According to (19) and (22), Bob and Eve receive the signal, respectively:
For the channel estimation error, it has a great impact on the secrecy capacity when the behavior of additive noise error and time-varying error is random and instable, accordingly. Therefore, we use the expectation of secrecy capacity to measure the impact of time-varying error and additive noise error [42] . Meanwhile, we derive the expectation expression of secrecy capacity under the channel estimation error condition as follow:
where ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ) represents the impact of timevarying error and additive noise error for the system capacity during whole signal transmission. Next subsection, we present ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ) derivation process in detail. By the Equation (28), we find that it is indeed affected by additive noise error and time-varying error.
C. APPLYING SINR TO DERIVE SECRECY CAPACITY
We calculate the system secrecy capacity by Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR) rather than Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR). SINR means the ratio of the intensity of received useful signal and interference signal (noises and interference). For the channel estimation error, the timevarying error can be regarded as interference. If we use SNR to calculate the secrecy capacity, the time-varying error will be treated as the additive noise error, which does not meet practical situation. Thus, we replace SNR with SINR. Bob's SINR is:
where γ 1−naive is Bob's SINR. Eve's SINR is:
where γ 2−naive is Eve's SINR. In Equations (29) and (30), error terms of e h and δ are only unknown, but we know their distributions. Therefore, we can obtain SINR distributions of Bob and Eve by the distributions of e h and δ. Furthermore, we can obtain the distribution of the system secrecy capacity under the channel estimation error. Since e h and δ are subject to the independent complex Gaussian distribution, we can obtain:
where N a is the total number of paths from the transmitter to receiver, including direct and reflected paths. We calculate the expectation of system secrecy capacity with four error terms.
D. RANDOM CHOICE DESIGN SCHEME From the analysis above, the impact of channel estimation error on the system secrecy capacity is mainly caused by the error term ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ). Therefore, if Alice can design randomness and power weight value of the random choice to make the channel estimation error equivalent to the artificial noise, the secrecy capacity will be improved. In this subsection, we solve the random choice W rand and C s−Native by artificial noise and beam-forming methods. By the Equation (28), we present the objective function: We use the equivalent artificial noise method to solve the Equation (36) , which ignores temporarily light intensity constraints for illumination and human eyes' perception. Namely, we only assume the artificial noise meets zero-forcing constraints: The optimization solution for the Equation (37) is the unit vector, which is generated by the vectorĝ H projecting into the null space of vectorĥ H .
. We place the Equation (38) into (36) (40) where σ 2 a = P z 2 + P s 1 + σ 2 1 and σ 2 b = P z w z * Hĝ Hĝ w * z + P z 4 + σ 2 2 + P s 3 . P (A, B) represents the maximum generalized eigenvalue from eigenvectors between the matrix A and B.
We obtain the optimization distribution of weighting coefficient, the randomness of random choice and optimal system secrecy capacity by placing Equations (38) and (40) into (36) .
Equation (41) is a convex function about ξ , we get the optimization solution by the computer iterative method. Optimization steps for (41) are as follows: 1.
1. Make k = 1, assuming ξ = 0.5, namely P s = P z = 0.5P; 2. Use Equations (40) and (38) As discussed above, we have found that the channel estimation error affects the system secrecy capacity. We optimize the secrecy capacity by the random choice scheme, which chooses transmission channels by the iterative computing. However, in practice, we cannot add artificial noise power or divide P into P s and P z for transmitting the data. Although this way is possible in wireless fields, it is not feasible in VLC fields. The reason is that, if the P s and P z are not the same, the LED will have the flicker problem. It is unacceptable for illumination and human eyes' perception. In order to solve the problem above, we increase the signal propagation time to compensate equivalent P z . We compare original signal and modified signal, as shown in Figure 3 . When we need P z = ξ * P, we adjust the duration for high level signal and low level signal so that the duration of the modified signal is 1 + 2ξ times of the original signal. This will ensure that the transmitted signal increases some energy to produce the equivalent artificial noise. Meanwhile, it meets the average and peak light intensity constraints. After the actual iterative computing, we find that ξ is in the range of 0.05−0.10. We are equivalent to change the problem of wireless signal power distribution into decreasing the VLC signal rate, so as to mitigate the channel estimation error. This method avoids the design of the power distribution in VLC fields while the rate is only reduced by 5%-10%, it is acceptable.
VI. EVALUATION
The proposed SecLight framework is evaluated through simulation with the parameter settings in Table 1 [43] . In MISO-VLC case, two LED lamps are located at a relative central location on the ceiling, illustrated in Fig. 2 . The area of the room is 5 * 5m 2 , and the ceiling height is 3m. Every LED lamp consists of one LED, and every LED radiates thirty Watt of optical power. In SISO-VLC case, an LED lamp is fixed at the center of ceiling. Bob and Eve are located at any position that is 0.85m high above ground, and each of them has a 70 • FoV and a single photodiode. The LEDs in the center is modulated by Alice to send 10 or 20 frames' data, and each frame's data consists of 1000 bit. We use a three-dimensional coordinate system (x, y, z) to represent receivers' locations. The origin (0,0,0) corresponds to the room center at the receivers level. The responsivity of photo-detector is 0.85.
A. PERFORMANCE METRICS
The metrics we use to measure the performance are BER [44] and Secrecy Capacity.
Secrecy Capacity: It's the maximum channel capacity, when Eve cannot completely intercept information from Bob who communicates with Alice in some coding ways.
It is defined as follows [45] :
where I (X ; Y ) and I (X ; Z ) are mutual information. It means that Y and Z (Bob and Eve) are able to get CSI from X (Alice).
Under the Gaussian condition:
where P is the transmitted power, σ 2 is the noise power, [] + represents that if C s is calculated as the negative, let C s = 0.
B. RESULTS IN SISO MODEL
In Figure 4 , the BER performance is shown for the data transmission of 10000 bit with time reversal (without random choice), when Bob and Eve are located at (0,0,0) and (0,-0.75,0), respectively. We can observe that time reversal brings a low BER for the legitimate receiver Bob, which means that the transmitted signal automatically focuses on legitimate receiver. Meanwhile, time reversal makes the eavesdropper Eve's BER keep very high so that he cannot decipher received information (green). However, when Eve uses Constant Modulus Algorithm (CMA) [25] to attack the channel, the BER of Eve's received information (red) is lower than 0.0038, which means that eavesdropper can decipher and obtain legitimate user's information. In Figure 5 , the position of Bob and Eve are randomly located at (0,0.6,0) and (0.1,1,0), respectively. The total volume of data increases to 20000 bit, and there is still no random choice. We can see that, due to increasing the total volume of data, Eve can better detect the regular change of channel by using CMA so that Eve's BER (red) further decreases.
In Figure 6 and Figure 7 , we plot the effect curve after adding random choice in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 , respectively. We can see that, Eve's BER increases. The reason is that Eve cannot get more CSI from Bob when the channel adds random choice. As for Eve who uses CMA, random choice makes CSI produce drastic change so that CMA is ineffective, i.e., Eve's BER (red) increases and does not meet the requirement of deciphering. In Figure 8 , we plot the curve of the secrecy capacity. Bob and Eve are located at (0,0,0) and (0,-0.75,0), respectively. SNR is from 10 to 28. When SNR gradually increases, σ 2 1 in the Equation (44) decreases, and then I (Y b ; S a ) will increase. Meanwhile, Eve's I (Y e ; S a ) keeps low all the time, although σ 2 2 decreases. The reason is that I (Y e ; S a ) is mainly affected by H e , and then H e is affected by time reversal and random choice, which make H e keep small amplitude, so that the change of σ 2 2 is negligible. Thus, C s will increase when SNR increases. The discussion above is the impact of various technologies on the system under the different SNR. In Figure 9 , we make Eve move through all room positions while Bob is fixed at (1,0.5,0) and SNR is set to 20. Through Fig. 9 , we can find that, Eve's BER decreases when he is very close to Bob. Similarly, In Figure 10 , we make Bob move through all room positions while Eve is fixed at (0,-0.75,0) and SNR is set to 20. We find that system secrecy capacity decreases at the same case. The reason for the result of Eve's BER and system secrecy capacity is that, the channel between Eve and Alice is similar to the channel between Bob and Alice so that Eve can get more information about Bob's channel. If the position of Eve and Bob is the same, the secrecy capacity and Eve's BER will be zero. In addition, BER and system secrecy capacity are slightly ups and downs in a small area, as shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 . It is mainly caused by random choice scheme and Gaussian noise. When the random choice scheme chooses different light reflect channels, it causes the change of channel state information slightly. When Bob is at the bottom of Alice, the secrecy capacity is maximum. In Figure 11 , we give the vertical view about Fig. 10 . The more red the color is, the higher the secrecy capacity is. When Bob is at bottom of Alice, the Bob can get more channel state information. The secrecy capacity is maximum. When the Bob is in the corner, the distance between Alice and Bob increases, the light intensity decreases so that the channel capacity decreases. Therefore, the system secrecy capacity decreases.
C. RESULTS IN THE CHANNEL CORRELATION MODEL
In Figures 12, 13 and 14 , we show the BER curves of no-correlation channel, correlation channel, and K-L transform channel, respectively. Bob is located at (0,0,0), while Eve is located at (0,0.75,0). The total volume of data is 10000 bit. By comparing Fig. 12 with Fig. 13 , we find that Eve's BER increases when the correlation exists. It is consistent with the conclusion in wireless networks [46] . Meanwhile, the correlation is almost no effect on Bob. The reason is that SecLight's time reversal makes transmitted signal automatically focus on legitimate user even in the condition of correlation channel. Note that, the negligible BER change is the effect of noise and random choice.
In Figure 14 , we observe that K-L transform does not impact the BER performance because its linearity. In the K-L transform, the signal is adjusted only in amplitude, and the singular value decomposition is chosen to cope with the channel correlation. Hence, the random choice and time reversal are not impacted by the K-L transform.
In Figure 15 , the system secrecy capacity is shown with Eve located at (1, 1, 0) and Bob staying at (0,0.3,0). SC, SC-corr, and SC-KL designate the curves of secrecy capacity with no channel correlation, with channel correlation, and with K-L transform, respectively. As expected, the secrecy capacity increases when SNR gets larger. An improvement in secrecy capacity is further met when the impact of channel correlation is mitigated. In Figure 16 , we plot the secrecy capacity curve when Bob moves through all room positions. The SNR is 20, and Eve's position is at (0,-0.75,0). As you can find that, when the impact of channel correlation is mitigated, the system secrecy capacity will improve. It verifies our theoretical analysis in Section IV.
D. RESULTS IN THE CHANNEL ESTIMATION ERROR MODEL
The impact of channel estimation error on the system secrecy capacity and BER is shown from Fig. 17 to Fig. 24 . The channel is MISO-VLC channel from Fig. 17 to Fig. 20 , where Bob is (0,0,0), Eve is (0,-0.75,0). It is SISO-VLC channel from Fig. 21 to Fig. 24 , where Bob is (0,0,0.3), Eve is (0,-0.75,0.6). The position of LED is shown in Fig. 2 . The values of Gaussian noise, time-varying error and additive noise error used from Fig. 17 to Fig. 24 are shown in Table 2 and Table 3 . Other default parameters are shown in Table 1 .
FIGURE 17. The impact of n 1 and n 2 on the system secrecy capacity, when the variances of e h , e g and η are 0.08 and time-varying channel factor β is 0.8. In Figure 17 , we plot the system secrecy capacity curve after adding channel estimation error. The variances of e h , e g and η are 0.08. We observe the impact of n 1 and n 2 on the channel with channel estimation error and the channel using equivalent artificial noise method. In figure 17 , we find that, when the system has channel estimation error, the secrecy capacity decreases. The secrecy capacity increases via the optimization. Meanwhile, we observe that the Gaussian noise does not have a strong effect on the channel with channel estimation error and the channel with the optimization algorithm.
FIGURE 18.
The impact of e h and e g on the system secrecy capacity, when the variances of n 1 , n 2 and η are 0.08 and time-varying channel factor β is 0.8.
In Figure 18 , we present the impact of e h and e g on the channel with channel estimation error and the channel using equivalent artificial noise method. The variances of n 1 , n 2 and η are 0.08. In Figure 18 we find that, when the variance of additive noise error decreases, the secrecy capacity increases and gradually reaches near the curve without channel estimation error (blue). It shows that the additive noise error is similar to Gaussian noise. Meanwhile, our equivalent artificial noise method can increase the system secrecy capacity.
FIGURE 19.
The impact of time-varying channel factor β on the system secrecy capacity, when the variances of n 1 , n 2 , η, e h and e g are 0.08.
In Figure 19 , we observe the impact of time-varying channel factor β on the channel with channel estimation error and the channel using equivalent artificial noise method. The variances of n 1 , n 2 , e h , e g and η are 0.08. In Figure 19 , we find that, when the time-varying channel factor is 0.1, the system secrecy capacity is very low. The reason is because it is significantly different between the original H e and H e with time-varying channel factor. The change of H e decreases the degree of certainty between Alice and Eve. Namely, the mutual information between Alice and Eve increases. When the time-varying channel factor is 1, the red line does not get closer to blue line. The reason is that the red line has still the additive noise error. In Figure 20 , we plot BER curve, when the variances of e h , e g and η are 0.08. The time-varying channel factor β is 0.8. We observe the impact of channel estimation error on BER. In figure 20 , we find that, the channel estimation error does not have an impact on BER. Because the additive noise error is similar to Gaussian noise, time reversal is still a good performance under the high Gaussian noise situation. As for the time-varying error, it only changes the amplitude of channel during two successive stages of channel estimation so that time reversal is not affected. Therefore, the channel estimation error does not have impact on BER.
We present the impact of channel estimation error on SISO-VLC from Figure 21 to Figure 24 . Meanwhile, we change the position of Bob and Eve. From Figure 21 to Figure 24 , we find that, the impact of channel estimation error on SISO-VLC is the same as MISO-VLC. Furthermore, the position of Bob and Eve does not affect the equivalent artificial noise method.
Here, we proceed to discuss the impact of Eve's positions on system secrecy capacity and BER under both SISO-VLC and MISO-VLC cases. However, when we make Bob or Eve move through all room positions, we need to select the fixed value for e h , e g , η and β. This is equivalent to add Gaussian noise to channels. The curves of Eve's BER and system secrecy capacity are similar to those in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 . 
VII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss prior work on VLC security schemes in detail.
A. VLC SECURITY
The Visible Light Communication has incomparable bandwidth resources comparing with the traditional wireless communication [47] , [48] , it has been proposed as a promising technology to alleviate the crisis of radio spectrum, due to the ubiquitous presence of LEDs in our world [49] , [50] . However, it is still in the initial exploration stage for VLC security. Mostafa and Lampe [17] first studied VLC security from the view point of physical layer. They proposed VLC-null-steering, which utilized null-steering and artificial noise strategies to achieve positive secrecy rates [21] . Then, they proposed VLC-friendly jamming, which utilized one jammer equipped with multiple light sources to prevent the eavesdropper [20] . They also proposed VLC bounds, which derived a closed-form secrecy rate lower and upper bounds under the condition of amplitude limit [22] , and proposed VLC Robust-beamforming, which considered the imperfect channel information regarding receiver and eavesdropper links [51] . Amukherjee [52] proposed Secret-Key, in which a two-stage numerical approach based on fractional programming was presented for the construction of a secret-key MISO beam-forming vector.
In our preliminary work [24] , we proposed a random time reversal scheme for both SISO-VLC and MISO-VLC systems, and only discussed the impact of channel correlation on the VLC security.
B. WIRELESS SECURITY
In 1975, Wyner [45] proposed the wire-tap channel model based on discrete memoryless channel (DMC). They proved that when the main channel (between Alice and Bob) was excellent than the tapping channel (between Alice and Eve), system could achieve the secrecy transmission without leaking any information to the eavesdropper. It is possible for physical layer security techniques to achieve more universal applications with the development of the multi-antenna technology. Artificial noise and Robust beam-forming methods were proposed in [53] and [54] . For imperfect CSI, most efforts focused on the channel estimation error. There are two channel estimation error models, one model was subject to the zero-mean uniform distribution and another model was subject to the zero-mean Gaussian distribution. They analyzed the impact of channel estimation error on the system secrecy capacity, the system secrecy rate [42] , BER [55] and SINR [39] . Meanwhile, Bashar et al. [56] discussed the impact of channel feedback delay on the physical layer security.
The time-reversal (TR) signal transmission is an ideal paradigm for VLC security. It had low energy consumption and its inherent nature could fully harvest energy by exploiting the multi-path propagation [57] . It was first used for the acoustic communication [58] and further applied in the underwater communication [59] , [60] . In recent years, it had been tested in the field of wireless communication [61] and mainly focused on the ultra-wideband (UWB) communication [62] .
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed SecLight, which considered the light reflection, light intensity, channel correlation and channel estimation error for enhancing the security of indoor VLC in Internet of Things (IoT). First, SecLight could improve VLC security via utilizing VLC's multi-path redundancy, time reversal and random choice techniques under SISO-VLC and MISO-VLC models, which can make transmitted signal automatically focus on legitimate user while interfering the eavesdropper's channel. Then, we have investigated the impact of channel correlation and channel estimation error on the system secrecy capacity through ε leaking factor, additive noise error and time-varying error. We have found that, when channel correlation and channel estimation error exist, the system secrecy capacity decreases. Furthermore, SecLight has applied both K-L transform and equivalent artificial noise methods to cope with the impact of channel correlation and channel estimation error on the system secrecy capacity with both average and peak light intensity constraints, respectively, which ultimately improves the secrecy capacity. Finally, we have conducted extensive experiments to validate SecLight performance.
